Folk Morality and Philosophical Metaethics

Folk Moral Relativism

Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective or relative, and most have maintained that ordinary people are moral objectivists. This belief is supported by previous studies showing that people tend to think that in cases of moral disagreement, one person must be wrong.

My colleagues and I challenged this view (2011), arguing that people's moral intuitions are more complex than previously thought. We hypothesized that people do not hold a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on how much they consider different perspectives on moral issues. To test this hypothesis, we conducted six studies. Here are some key findings:

• People are more likely to endorse moral relativism when considering individuals from different cultures or with radically different values. For example, American participants were more likely to say that both a classmate and a member of a fictional Amazonian tribe could be correct when arriving at opposing judgments of a specific action, compared to if the disagreement was between two American college students.
• The degree to which people consider alternative perspectives influences their moral judgments. Active engagement with different cultures and ways of life can lead people towards moral relativism.
• This pattern holds true across cultures: The study found similar results with participants in the United States and Singapore.
• People are not simply expressing a general relativism about all topics. They distinguish between moral and non-moral issues, showing a greater tendency towards relativism in the moral domain.
• People distinguish between whether a belief is true and whether someone has good reason to hold that belief. They may believe that people from different cultures can hold different moral beliefs without either being false, even if they don't necessarily think those beliefs are equally justified.

We conclude that ordinary people's intuitions about morality are not fully captured by claiming they are moral objectivists.

In a subsequent paper (2019), Mark Phelan and I tested the hypothesis that the pervasive connection between religion and morality in ordinary life might be a driver of folk moral objectivism. God may be viewed as a divine guarantor of right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient for moral objectivism? We present original research showing that:

• When controlling for religiosity, age, and belief in God's loving characteristics, it is belief in God's punishing characteristics (specifically, the existence of Hell) that uniquely predicts rejection of moral relativism.
• Followers of Abrahamic faiths are more likely to endorse moral objectivism when thinking of the Divine, regardless of loving or punishing characteristics.
• Priming for moral objectivism makes theists more likely to endorse God's punishing characteristics.

For Abrahamic theists, then, God's particular characteristics are not germane to the question of whether his moral commandments are real and objective. And while theists strongly endorse God's loving characteristics, focusing on the objective nature of morality can highlight God's punishing nature, reminding theists that objective morality requires a divine guarantor of justice to enforce it.

Folk Platitudes and Philosophical Metaethics

These findings challenge traditional philosophical views of folk morality, suggesting a need to rethink how philosophers approach and interpret ordinary moral practice. In another paper (2017), I argue that philosophers treat folk metaethics as the foundation for their theories, assuming that ordinary people are generally committed to the existence of objective moral facts. They reach this conclusion by analyzing ordinary moral discourse and identifying common "platitudes" or truisms, such as the belief that every moral question has a correct answer.

I challenge this philosophical method by highlighting that philosophers rarely investigate folk metaethics systematically. Instead, they often rely on their own intuitions about what ordinary people believe, which may be inaccurate. For instance, philosophers frequently cite people's engagement in heated moral debates as evidence of belief in objective moral truths. However, recent experimental work by philosophers and psychologists—including my research mentioned above—suggests that people's beliefs about moral objectivity are far more nuanced. For example, studies have shown that people's willingness to see moral questions as having a single right answer is influenced by various factors, such as how the issue is framed and whether they're encouraged to approach disagreements competitively or collaboratively. These findings indicate that folk morality isn't a monolithic entity, but rather a complex, dynamic system shaped by diverse social and cognitive factors.

Ultimately, I contend that philosophers need to engage with empirical research from fields like psychology and anthropology to develop a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of folk metaethics. By drawing on a broader range of evidence, including experimental studies, philosophers can avoid mistaking their own potentially idiosyncratic beliefs for those of ordinary people.

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