This project has been the focus of a series of presentations at Yale University (2022), York University (2023), Sungkyunkwan University (Seoul, 2023), and a workshop in Delphi, Greece (2023). I'm currently refining a draft paper while exploring avenues to further develop this research.
Moral Convictions
Human beings are driven by moral convictions—deeply held beliefs about right and wrong. These convictions animate our lives and inspire us to make what we perceive as positive changes in the world. However, they can also render us intolerant of those who disagree, leading to various forms of dehumanization. This project explores the nature of moral convictions, their behavioral consequences, and the contrasting approaches offered by the Mozi and Zhuangzi texts in classical China to mitigate their potential harms.
The Nature of Moral Convictions
Psychologist Linda Skitka and collaborators propose that morality is not an inherent feature of decisions or actions but rather a meta-perception that individuals hold about a subset of them. Moral convictions are stable, internalized, and treated as personal possessions. People perceive them as universally true, evoking strong emotions and shaping social and political behavior.
Importantly, moral convictions can have significant negative consequences, including:
- Intolerance: Reduced acceptance of those with differing beliefs.
- Conflict: Difficulty in resolving disagreements.
- Violence: Willingness to use force to achieve desired ends.
Moral Convictions in Early Chinese Texts
I argue that two texts from classical Chinese thought—the Mozi and Zhuangzi—affirm that (a) falling into the grip of moral convictions is endemic to human existence and (b) this should be a source of grave concern.
The Mohist State of Nature
The Mozi (ca. 5th century BCE) presents a stark vision of a pre-societal state where individuals, driven by their own moral convictions, create mutual acrimony and widespread conflict. The situation can be summarized as follows:
- Natural Moral Convictions: Individuals are inherently prone to moral convictions, driven by their sense of rightness (yi 義).
- Intolerance of Disagreement: People view their own moral convictions as superior, dismissing those of others.
- Conflict and Strife: Differing conceptions of moral rightness (yi 義) lead to disagreement, tension, and eventual conflict.
- Dehumanization: A tendency to view others as less than human.
In this state of nature, families are torn apart and individuals engage in violence to defend their moral beliefs. The Mohists paint a bleak picture of a world where people are so consumed by their own righteousness that they refuse to cooperate or share with those holding different values.
Zhuangzi on Shi-Fei (是非) Cognition
Similarly, some of the most passionate passages in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi (ca. 4th century BCE) describe how our sense of right and wrong seems to impel us into lives of pointless and wretched conflict, blinding us to alternative perspectives. According to this text, it is part of our basic disposition to categorize the world, seeing things as either "this" or "that," good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable. This natural disposition (qing 情) can be enhanced and entrenched through disputes, as differing parties aim to convince one another of the unique correctness of their own guiding discourse (dao 道).
Echoing the Mohist state of nature, the text claims that we affirm the correctness of our own convictions. Moreover, any affirmative act of assertion, any statement of what is right (shi 是), will generate its opposite—what is wrong (fei 非).
Is There a Way Out?
After drawing parallels between these texts, I note that they present radically different methods for dealing with the dangers of moral convictions. The Mozi suggests that our convictions can be unified if there is a compelling moral vision that gains universal assent. They claim to have such an account, focused on generating order, abundance, and material welfare for everyone impartially. The Mohists used arguments to advocate for their views and persuade others to adopt them.
The Zhuangzi claims that we can achieve a state of mind where we are no longer in the grip of such shi-fei (this-that) cognition, avoiding destructive behavior and the internal self-harm that accrues from categorical attachments and aversions. Like the Mohists, this text uses argumentation, arguing that all moral convictions ultimately reduce to question-begging foundational assumptions. However, in contrast with the Mohists, Zhuangzi also invites us to laugh at ourselves and see the drive to justify our question-begging convictions as futile and silly.
Both the Mohist and Zhuangzi perspectives offer valuable insights into the challenges posed by moral convictions. The Mohists emphasize rational discourse and a shared moral framework, while Zhuangzi proposes a more radical approach that involves transcending the limitations of categorical thinking.
In future work, I aim to broaden the scope of my investigation. Xunzi (fl. ca. 3rd century BCE), for example, famously argued that rival thinkers cling to a single facet of truth, molding their philosophies around it. This, he maintains, results in a narrow and distorted worldview. I intend to explore the parallels and differences between Xunzi's perspective and those discussed above. Furthermore, I plan to delve into the existing empirical literature to examine how self-deprecating humor might loosen the grip of one's moral convictions.