The Two Wings of Confucianism: Uncovering the Roots of a Fracture

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: Despite holding the same metaphysical views, mastering the same curriculum, passing the same examination systems, and venerating the same thinkers from their tradition (namely, Confucius and Mencius), the Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Song-Ming period (ca 10th to 17th centuries CE) disagreed in sharp and strident ways on questions concerning the proper sources of ethical knowledge and the proper methods of self-cultivation.

The Intuitive Wing (also known as the Lu-Wang 陸王 school or School of Mind 心學) advocates a central method of self-cultivation: attentive introspection of one's mental activity. This involves monitoring one's mind and learning to recognize liangzhi (良知), an innate faculty of perception and moral guidance. Neo-Confucian metaphysics posits patterns or principles (li 理) that permeate the universe, explaining broad regularities in human and natural worlds. These patterns also inhere in one's mind, and in their purest form, comprise liangzhi. Typically, selfish desires obscure access to this faculty. However, through rigorous self-scrutiny and meditation, one can remove these desires and other biases, allowing liangzhi to guide one's actions. Over time, this leads to consistently right behavior in harmony with the world.

In contrast, the Investigative Wing (known as the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 school or School of Pattern 理學) views this introspective approach as overly subjective. While not denying liangzhi's existence, they consider attempts to isolate it through introspection impractical. Instead, they advocate clarifying one's mental patterns by understanding those in the external world. This approach, called gewu (格物) or "investigation of things," encompasses study of contemporary affairs, classical texts, social and political history, human dynamics, and natural patterns. Such comprehensive, reverential study uncovers the principles (li 理) permeating the cosmos, revealing how everything interconnects and how universal harmony is achievable. For the Investigative Wing, this knowledge—not introspection—leads to moral clarity and right action.

The disagreement between these wings persisted for centuries, with each side accusing the other of misunderstanding their collectively revered tradition. What caused this division? Why did it endure?

In this monograph, I argue that the fracture occurred at the very dawn of the Confucian tradition, when Mengzi (aka Mencius, fl. ca. 4th century BCE)—a towering figure to all Song-Ming philosophers—made the momentous claim that human nature is good, containing the beginnings or sprouts (duan 端) of moral knowledge and virtue. Mengzi maintained that morality is innate to the human mind—something we bring to the world prior to experience. He supported this claim by pointing to spontaneous and uncontrived episodes of compassion everyone experiences at the sight of innocent suffering (such as his famous "child falling in the well" example). He argued that the human mind inclines toward goodness just as mouths prefer delicious foods or ears favor harmonic sounds. Mengzi believed that focusing (si 思) on these natural inclinations, and thereby strengthening them, was sufficient to lead most people to goodness.

Mengzi eventually became enshrined as the orthodox interpreter of the tradition's founding figure—Kongzi (aka Confucius, fl. ca. 6th century BCE). Mengzi saw himself as defending and further articulating Kongzi's views. However, Kongzi's teachings contain no commitment to the moral nativism just outlined. Instead, Kongzi repeatedly emphasized that self-cultivation and moral growth are lengthy, laborious journeys of enculturation, including the reverential study of history, ritual, poetry, music, and many other disciplines. This was no easy task. Xunzi (fl. ca. 3rd century BCE), a later champion of Kongzi's thought and the most systematic and distinguished thinker of the classical period, found Mengzi's views about human nature not only implausible but also threatening to undermine the value of teachers and texts, thus betraying Kongzi's vision. After all, why study if moral guidance already exists in your heart?

Others have noted this tension between Kongzi and Xunzi on the one hand, and Mengzi on the other (e.g. Ivanhoe, 2000; Nichols et al., 2018; Slingerland, 2007). Indeed, this tension parallels that among the Neo-Confucians, even though all Neo-Confucians (Intuitive and Investigative wings alike) endorse Mengzi's views of human nature and judge his philosophy as continuous with that of Kongzi. This Neo-Confucian consensus (Graham, 1992) has masked an unbridgeable divide within the tradition concerning the proper sources of moral knowledge. Kongzi and Xunzi maintained that moral questions could be answered by looking to the past and emulating the practices of sage kings and accomplished heroes—preserving and transmitting time-tested knowledge, rites, and institutions. This pragmatic conservatism involves continuous study followed by implementation, experimentation, reflection, and practice. By contrast, Mengzi's claim that moral guidance can be found in the spontaneous inclinations of one's own mind introduced a second, distinct source of moral knowledge—one that stands on its own and needs no appeal to tradition or past experience (Hansen, 1992).

So why did Mengzi make this claim? Scholars have proposed various explanations. One view suggests that Mengzi's assertion was a dialectical move to provide a solid foundation for his normative ethical theory; by rooting moral knowledge in human nature, he could argue for the universality and permanence of his preferred ethical principles. Another view posits that Mengzi was trying to answer the general question "Why be moral?" by suggesting that, in some deep sense, we already are. Others maintain that Mengzi was responding to the intellectual climate of his time; human nature had become a hot topic in philosophical discourse, and Mengzi may have felt compelled to stake out a distinctive position. Yet another interpretation argues that Mengzi's claim about innate human goodness was never intended as a substantive metaphysical statement. Instead, Mengzi recognized the practical benefits of promoting a belief in natural human goodness; by encouraging people to notice their moral capacities—whatever their origin—he may have hoped to foster ethical behavior and social harmony.

In this project, I will delve into these questions, surveying existing answers in the scholarly literature and critically examining each interpretation's strengths and weaknesses. In doing so, I aim to illuminate Mengzi's philosophical motivations, as well as the far-reaching implications of his claim for Confucian thought.

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