IV - Ethics and the Limits of Argument
Is there, then, no way to refute the ethical egoist? If by “refute” we mean show that he has made some logical error, the answer is that there is not. However, there is something more that can be said. The egoist challenge to our ordinary moral convictions amounts to a demand for an explanation of why we should adopt certain policies of action, namely policies in which the good of others is given importance. We can give an answer to this demand, albeit an indirect one. The reason one ought not to do actions that would hurt other people is: Other people would be hurt. The reason one ought to do actions that would benefit other people is: Other people would be benefited. This may at first seem like a piece of philosophical sleight- of-hand, but it is not. The point is that the welfare of human beings is something that most of us value for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of something else. Therefore, when further reasons are demanded for valuing the welfare of human beings, we cannot point to anything further to satisfy this demand. It is not that we have no reason for pursuing these policies, but that our reason is that these policies are for the good of human beings.
So if we are asked, “Why shouldn’t I set fire to this department store?” one answer would be, “Because if you do, people may be burned to death.” This is a complete, sufficient reason which does not require qualification or supplementation of any sort. If someone seriously wants to know why this action shouldn’t be done, that’s the reason. If we are pressed further and asked the skeptical question, “But why shouldn’t I do actions that will harm others?” we may not know what to say—but this is because the questioner has included in his question the very answer we would like to give: “Why shouldn’t you do actions that will harm others? Because doing those actions would harm others.” The egoist, no doubt, will not be happy with this. He will protest that we may accept this as a reason, but he does not. And here the argument stops: There are limits to what can be accomplished by argument, and if the egoist really doesn’t care about other people—if he honestly doesn’t care whether they are helped or hurt by his actions—then we have reached those limits. If we want to persuade him to act decently toward his fellow humans, we will have to make our appeal to such other attitudes as he does possess, by threats, bribes, or other cajolery. That is all that we can do.
Though some may find this situation distressing (we would like to be able to show that the egoist is just wrong), it holds no embarrassment for common morality. What we have come up against is simply a fundamental requirement of rational action, namely, that the existence of reasons for action always depends on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent. For example, the fact that a certain course of action would make the agent a lot of money is a reason for doing it only if the agent wants to make money; the fact that practicing at chess makes one a better player is a reason for practicing only if one wants to be a better player; and so on. Similarly, the fact that a certain action would help the agent is a reason for doing the action only if the agent cares about his own welfare, and the fact that an action would help others is a reason for doing it only if the agent cares about others. In this respect ethical egoism and what we might call ethical altruism are in exactly the same fix: Both require that the agent care about himself, or other people, before they can get started.
So a nonegoist will accept “It would harm another person” as a reason not to do an action simply because he cares about what happens to that other person. When the egoist says that he does not accept that as a reason, he is saying something quite extraordinary. He is saying that he has no affection for friends or family, that he never feels pity or compassion, that he is the sort of person who can look on scenes of human misery with complete indifference, so long as he is not the one suffering. Genuine egoists, people who really don’t care at all about anyone other than themselves, are rare. It is important to keep this in mind when thinking about ethical egoism; it is easy to forget just how fundamental to human psychological makeup the feeling of sympathy is. Indeed, a man without any sympathy at all would scarcely be recognizable as a man; and that is what makes ethical egoism such a disturbing doctrine in the first place...