Classical Confucian Metaethics

Well functioning dao 道

In my target paper, I explore how David Velleman's metaethical framework, outlined in Foundations for Moral Relativism, bears striking similarities to classical Confucian ethics. I argue that Confucianism might be amenable to a form of relativism—even though Confucians would likely reject such a label.

I begin by examining Velleman's view that moral norms emerge from a basic human drive for sociality. Our craving to be among others of our kind necessitates mutual understanding. This leads communities to develop shared practices—ways of acting and being—that enable mutual comprehension and, consequently, social life. Velleman terms these shared practices "doables." I then draw an analogy between Velleman's doables and the Confucian concept of li (rites or ritual propriety). Both the li and doables are socially constituted norms that coordinate individuals and facilitate shared social life. Notably, both Velleman and the Confucians resist drawing a hard distinction between moral and non-moral norms. For both, the boundaries between etiquette, social customs, and moral rules are blurred. The li, like Velleman's doables, encompass a wide range of practices—some seemingly trivial, others clearly morally significant.

Next, I consider how this combined Confucian-Vellemanian framework might analyze a well-functioning society. Here, the concept of "harmony" emerges as central. A harmonious society, in this view, is one where the existing social ontology—the li or the doables—allows the community to successfully coordinate its members' diverse perspectives and interests, which always risk instability and defection.

Some might resist the suggestion that Confucianism is committed to moral relativism at the metaethical level. Indeed, I acknowledge that, despite these deep similarities, classical Confucians would likely reject the "relativist" label. They viewed their way of life, rooted in the traditions of the waning Zhou dynasty, as uniquely effective for human flourishing. They wouldn't entertain the idea that other social ontologies could foster harmony. I argue that this Confucian resistance to relativism stems from a kind of error. Lacking exposure to other flourishing societies, they overestimated the uniqueness and importance of their own way of life. Had they been aware of the cultural diversity we recognize today, I believe they would have been more open to the possibility of multiple, equally successful social ontologies.

Harmony or Coherence? Velleman's Commentary

In his response, Velleman concurs with my assessment that his view blurs the lines between morals and mores, with mores potentially evolving into morals. However, he explains that he didn't frame it this way because most philosophers view these concepts as distinct—believing social norms (mores) stem from external factors like conformity, while morality arises from internal forces. Velleman's aim is to argue that mores also originate from an internal drive, which he terms "the drive toward intelligibility." This innate desire, he contends, is what renders mores both pervasive and powerful. Furthermore, he posits that this need for mutual understanding fosters cooperation rather than conflict.

Velleman argues that the drive toward intelligibility enables meaningful comparisons between societies based on how well they facilitate this achievement. He cites historical examples of social progress, such as the fight for gender equality, as movements towards greater intelligibility. While he supports ranking societies on this criterion, he emphasizes that this ranking shouldn't be construed as moral. Instead, he proposes terms like "more rationally advanced" to describe such societies.

Velleman suggests that this pursuit of intelligibility could theoretically guide humanity towards a single, optimal way of life. Yet, he acknowledges that this endpoint might not be unique. Multiple, equally valid paths toward intelligibility might exist, with historical circumstances determining which path is ultimately followed. Thus, while a theoretical ideal might exist, it doesn't negate the relativistic nature of his claims about mores, as different paths could lead to different yet equally valid outcomes.

Finally, he agrees that "harmony" is a desirable societal characteristic, but only when understood as "coherence"—the alignment of a society's norms with the objective of intelligibility. He disagrees if "harmony" is interpreted as necessitating qualities like cooperation. While acknowledging that more advanced societies might tend towards this kind of harmony, he maintains that it's not inevitable.

My Reply to Velleman

In my reply, I argue that Velleman is attempting to have it both ways. He maintains that moralities are contingent products of a deeper human drive for intelligibility, yet also claims that some moralities are objectively "better" based on how well they satisfy this drive. I contend that his focus on "intelligibility" underestimates the importance of social harmony—in the richer Confucian sense—as a marker of a truly successful way of life. More crucially, I believe it overlooks a key factor in sustaining moral communities.

If moralities are indeed sets of shared practices emerging contingently from the human drive for sociality, then a community's ability to sustain these practices becomes paramount. When individuals in a society don't feel bound to a shared set of norms or lack a sense of belonging and shared purpose, that society will struggle to survive, let alone flourish. This, I argue, is where the Confucian concept of harmony offers a more robust account of a well-functioning society.

I propose that Velleman should give greater prominence to the idea that a community's ability to harmonize—to coordinate and sustain its members' diverse perspectives and interests—is itself a key indicator of a well-functioning, and thus "better," morality. A morality incapable of producing harmony—one that fails to garner buy-in and sustain its system of shared norms—will struggle to hold its members together. It will lose its normative force and, in Velleman's own words, "everything [will be] normatively weightless."

In future work, I plan to examine whether my proposed error theory for Confucian absolutism holds up to scrutiny by looking at comparatively overlooked text, such as the Ritual Record 禮記 and the Sayings from Confucius’s Household 孔子家語.

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